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George Peter Mwanza and Melvin Beene v Attorney General Appeal No. 153/2016 SC 
Selected Judgment No. 33 of 2019 
 
Ellah T.M. Siang’andu1 
 
 
The Facts and Legal Arguments  
On the 9th December 2019, the Supreme Court of Zambia delivered a landmark decision 
changing the human rights jurisprudence in the context of protecting and preserving the 
fundamental human rights of prisoners. The appellants were HIV positive and were both in 
custody at the Lusaka Central Prison. They petitioned the High Court contending breach of 
their rights to life and protection from inhuman treatment contrary to the Republican 
Constitution.2 The argument of the appellants was that the State’s failure to consider their 
dietary and health needs, due to the budgetary and logistical restraints, fell short of all 
prescribed standards for the minimum treatment of prisoners. The appellants argued that their 
right to life was violated or threatened by being fed an inadequate diet that was contrary to the 
recommended rations as provided by the law.3  
 
They further argued that they were being held in overcrowded prison cells with inadequate 
ventilation, coupled with a lack of flushable lavatories. The conditions in which they were held 
made their environment unsanitary. Consequently, making the inmates more vulnerable to 
contracting communicable diseases such as pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) and diarrhoea. The 
duo argued that this worsened their health conditions, and was a threat to their already 
compromised immune systems. The appellants, aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, 
appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing in the main that the learned trial judge of the High 
Court misdirected herself in law and in fact when she held that their claims were not justiciable 
under the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Article 112 (d) of the Constitution. 
 
The Holding  
The Supreme Court held that: first, adjudication through courts could not be the main means 
of fulfilling the realisation of the violated economic and social rights of the inmates.  The role 
                                                             
1 LLB (University of Hull), LLM (University of Nottingham), LLD (University of South Africa), lecturer in law 
at the University of Zambia 
2 Article 11, 12 & 15 of the Constitution of Zambia, 1991, (as amended by Act No.18 of 1996 and Amendment 
Act No. 2 of 2016). 
3 Rule 17(2) of the Prison Rules and the First Schedule to the Prisons Act, Chapter 97 of the Laws of Zambia. 




of making economic and social rights a reality is restricted to the political branch or 
independent constitutional bodies like the Human Rights Commission. Within the separation 
of powers context, the state comprises of two political branches namely the executive and the 
legislature.4 Second, that the state was in breach of the two prisoners’ rights to life and 
protection against inhuman and degrading treatment as provided under the Constitution. Third, 
that preferential treatment be accorded to prisoners with special dietary needs due to conditions 
like “HIV, diabetes, high blood pressure, cholesterol problems, allergies, religious dietary 
requirements or any nutritional concerns,”5 in furtherance of their right to life. Thus, the 
Supreme Court ordered the State to do as follows: immediately take measures to decongest the 
Lusaka Central Correctional Facility; to report to a session judge at all successive opening days 
of the Lusaka session of the High Court on actions adopted to decongest the facility; and to 
increase the allocation of resources to Lusaka Correctional Facility for purposes of improving 
the dietary needs of prisoners, especially those that are HIV positive and to ensure their diet 
conforms with the prison rules. 6 
 
Significance 
The case is significant as it raises the following substantial issues; the concept of justiciability 
of the prisoner’s right to food and health; the justiciability of socio-economic rights generally; 
clarifying the standard of treatment for incarcerated persons; and the role of the State and the 
judiciary in the realisation of socio-economic rights within the context of the first generation 
rights addressed in the Constitution.7  
 
The notion of justiciability according to the judgement8 refers to the capacity to claim a remedy 
before an independent and impartial body, following a breach of a right or when it is likely to 
occur. It refers to the ability of individuals to access justice for the purposes of seeking a remedy 
for the violation of recognised rights. It is thus not a requirement for application of economic 
and social rights, but due to a violation of a right or where it is likely to occur. Based on the 
definition, justiciable rights holders have the ability to seek legal recourse to enforce the rights 
                                                             
4 J Locke Second Treatise of the Government: An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent and End of Civil 
Government (1689). 
5 George Peter Mwanza, Melvin Beene and Attorney General Appeal No. 153/2016 SC Selected Judgment No. 
33 of 2019 para. 16.6. 
6 Ibid. para 16.7 & 16.8. 
7  n 1, Articles 11 -26.  
8 n 4, Para 7.5. 




when the duty bearer [the state, through the Zambia Correctional Service] fails to uphold those 
rights.9 However, the Supreme Court further qualifies its definition of justiciability by 
concluding that rights specified in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution are as a matter of fact 
justiciable.10 There is no basis provided for the definition. It is thus unclear why and how the 
notion of justiciability is vital to Courts in the adjudication of socio-economic rights. The 
readers are thus left to guess how the state, Zambia, can be expected to comply with its own 
rules on the diet and conditions of incarceration for prisoners at the Lusaka Central Prison. The 
judgment does not shed light on how the state can address the problem of overcrowding by 
ensuring that the cell initially built to contain 15 prisoners, does not accommodate 75 or more 
prisoners. 
 
It could only be understood that the meaning of the term justiciability is based on the Supreme 
Court’s understanding and assumptions about its role and competence. This is further 
manifested in the case based on the decision of the court to adjudicate on issues concerning 
issues it initially deemed to be non-justiciable. Aoife Nolan contends that the concept of 
justiciability based on assumptions about the role and competences of courts is more reason 
why these assumptions must be subject to questions.11 For instance, is Zambia obliged to 
provide legal remedies for the rights under the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)? If so, to what extent does Zambia accept the right to food and 
health as adjudicable rights? 
 
The judgment establishes nexus between the socio-economic rights to food and health and the 
civil and political right to life and protection from inhuman treatment. The Court creates 
competences for itself in upholding the inmates’ civil and political rights to life and protection 
from inhuman treatment. Courts can create their own competence as long as they have the 
valour to be innovative and a conviction that the principles at stake are legitimate concerns for 
the judiciary.12  
 
                                                             
9  n 4, Para 7.5. 
10 n 1 above, Article 11 – 26. 
11  Aoife Nolan The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal (2007) available at 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434944  
12 Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, ‘Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? 141 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 141 (1992) 1, pp. 35-36. 




Nevertheless, courts must be cautious about how the socio-economic rights are enforced. This 
is due to the nature of the rights in question. Where the court rules that there is a need to 
recognise socio-economic rights like in the instance case, it would have been necessary to 
clarify how they must be enforced. For instance, the judgment does not clarify whether the 
justiciable rights of inmates translate into subjective guarantees, meaning granting them an 
entitlement to make direct claims as individuals. Or whether there are merely intended to be 
applied as objective standards, hence, imposing an obligation on the state to act. Other than the 
latter, the individual may not force the state to act in compliance with its obligations. 
 
There is no consensus on the justiciability of socio-economic rights. Nearly seventy-five years 
after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the substance and status of 
economic and social rights remain contentious. This is despite the fact that socio-economic 
rights are enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), a treaty that Zambia is a state party to. The rhetoric of justiciability of socio-
economic rights demonstrated in the judgment is not restricted to Zambia. The question is 
whether judges can legitimately pronounce themselves on economic and social issues. The 
question is whether judges are competent to adjudicate policy issues. 
 
Concerns about justiciability of economic and social rights are based on three assumptions: i) 
that economic and social rights are innately different from civil and political rights; ii) that it 
is not legitimate or suitable for courts to intervene into the domain of economic and social 
policy; and iii) that courts lack the ability to appropriately adjudicate and enforce economic 
and social rights.13 However, scholars have argued that all three of these propositions are highly 
questionable. For instance, Siegel contends that justiciability does not have a strict and 
reasonably apparent purpose but several.14 Thus, purposes of justiciability include: (1) 
“litigation-enhancement theory” which seeks to improve court performance by rendering 
litigants a stake in the effect of cases. It is centred around the nature of arguments raised; (2) 
separation of powers theory which restricts courts from intruding on the prerogatives of other 
branches of government, particularly the executives and the legislature; (3) passive virtues 
theory, to allow for the courts to safely evade socially problematic rulings.15 The fact that there 
                                                             
13  Aoife Nolan The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal (2007) available at 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434944  
14 Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73 (2007). 
15 Ibid 177. 




are several purposes for determining the justiciability of the matter implies it is necessary to 
justify the reasoning for making specific socio-economic rights justiciable. 
 
The judgment clarifies the standard of treatment for incarcerated persons. The Supreme Court 
has made it abundantly clear that prisoners’ rights are human rights first. In the United States, 
as early as 1979, the United States Supreme Court clarified that prisoners do not forfeit all their 
constitutional rights.16 Essentially, all the existing legal provisions and directives of State 
policy confirm that prisoners should be treated with due respect for their inherent dignity and 
value as human beings, without any form of discrimination. The judgment highlights the need 
for Zambia to take effective measures towards the protection of prisoners’ fundamental rights 
in line with its national17 and international human rights obligations.18  It is imperative to 
rethink the archaic position on the justiciability of socio-economic rights. This is because socio-
economic rights have been adjudicated upon across the African region.19 
 
The ruling demonstrates that the Supreme Court is cognisant of its adjudication, rulemaking 
and gatekeeping roles under the Zambian legal system. To some extent, the courts have a duty 
to ensure that the rights of prisoners are upheld. The Court acknowledges that international law 
has asserted the interdependence and indivisibility of economic, social and cultural and civil 
and political rights.20 The case illustrates how resorting to international instruments both 
                                                             
16 Bell v Wolfish, 441 U.S 520 (1979).  
17 The Prison Act and Regulations, Chapter 97 of the Laws of Zambia, the constitution,  
18 the 1957 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners Adopted by the First UN 
Congresses on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at 
Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and Social Council by its resolution 663 (XXIV) of 31 July 
1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977, the 1988 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, the 1990 Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, the 1985 UN 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, the 1990 UN Rules for the Protection of 
Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (known as “JDL’s’ or ‘Havana Rules’), and the 1997 Guidelines for Action 
on Children in the Criminal Justice System, the Bangkok Rules, or officially, the United Nations Rules for the 
Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders Adopted in United General 
Assembly Resolution A/RES/65/229 December 2010. 
19 Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, Communication 241/200. Decided at 33rd Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission, 15-29 May 2003(dealing with the right health of mental health patients); SERAC and CESR v. 
Nigeria African Commission on Human Rights, Case No. 155/96, Decision made at 30th Ordinary Session, 
Banjul, The Gambia, from 13th to 27th October 2001 (dealing with the right to health and the implied rights to 
food and housing). For more on the Commission’s treatment of social and economic rights, see Joe Olaka-
Onyanga, ‘Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in Africa’, 
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 26 (1995), 1. 
20 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) (Article 5) and the Proclamation of Tehran 
(1968) (para 13). For a discussion of the concept of interdependence in the context of human rights, see C. Scott, 
‘The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International 
Covenants on Human Rights’, Osgoode Hall LJ, Vol. 27 (1989), 769, 779-790. 




binding,21 and non-binding22 and the judgments of foreign superior courts can greatly assist 
Zambian the courts to perform their interpretive function in a conversant and equitable manner. 
The role of courts must also evolve with the changing understanding of fundamental rights. 
Courts must be able to respond to new challenges and problems that arise due to governance 
of the correctional facilities and human rights generally. 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision to proceed to adjudicate on the matter at hand implies that the 
court recognises its role in protecting and enforcing the fundamental rights of the prisoners. In 
effect, the court engaged in a constructive role of recognition of the plight of HIV positive 
prisoners. Hence, affording an opportunity for access to justice for prisoners. Such an approach 
has the potential to enhance equality for other disadvantaged prisoners who may feel that their 
human rights has been neglected or likely to be violated by the duty bearer. Socio-economic 
rights are key in upholding the principles of equality and non-discrimination which are both 
recognised in the Constitution. 
 
Adopting a narrow application of the interpretation of the judgment implies that the orders of 
the Court are restricted to improving the prison conditions at the Lusaka Central Prison only. 
No reference is made to other correctional facilities countrywide. What about the other prisons 
in Zambia? Can the state even afford to meet its own rules on the conditions of prisons and 
prisoners at the Lusaka Central Correctional Facility and correctional facilities elsewhere in 
Zambia? The Supreme Court approaches the issue of prison conditions from a narrow 
perspective and does not account for the harsh prison conditions that are prevalent in prisons 
countrywide.  
 
The narrow interpretation approach if adopted would not only exclude but also disregard other 
vulnerable prisoners such as elderly prisoners, women incarcerated with children, who have 
the extra responsibility of having to care for their children while in prison; and breast feeding 
mothers, in need of an adequate diet in order to be able to provide sufficient food for their 
newly born child. These categories of prisoners are also equally in need of their social- 
economic rights to food and heath to be realised. The exclusion of other vulnerable prisoners 
                                                             
21 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1966, entered into force 1976, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, entered into force 1976.    
22 Article 20 (1) of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 1955, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights 1948. 




would be contrary to the fundamental principles of equality and non-discrimination enshrined 
in the Constitution.  
 
The decision could imply that the state or the prison authorities can no longer continue to 
violate the fundamental rights of prisoners generally. Most importantly, it prevents the state 
from continuing to violate the rights of prisoners on the basis of restricted resources. As quite 
rightly pointed out by the Supreme Court, the Human Rights Committee, in its General 
Comment 38 years ago,23 stated that a state cannot invoke a lack of adequate material or 
financial resources or financial difficulties as a justification for inhuman treatment. Therefore, 
the state is obliged to provide detainees and prisoners with services required to gratify their 






















                                                             
23 General Committee No. 9/16 of 27th July, 1982 
